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Landscape Democracy in a Globalizing
World: The Case of Tange Lake
FINN ARLER
Development and Planning, Aalborg University, Denmark
ABSTRACT The main topic of the article is the question of landscape democracy in a world
where local issues are seldom just local. This topic is treated both in general terms and in relation
to one particular case: the artificial Tange Lake in Denmark. The first part narrates the story of
Tange Lake. It identifies the most important international drivers that have influenced landscape
development in the area directly or indirectly through the actions of a variety of local actors with
conflicting conceptions of landscape quality. The variety of drivers, actors and conceptions
present at Tange as well as in a great number of similar cases raises questions concerning levels
and models of landscape democracy. This is the main theme of the second part. First, three basic
democratic values are identified together with three orders or levels of impartiality. Second, the
relation between levels of democratic decision-making is discussed with the principle of
subsidiarity and the concentric circle theory as guiding lines. In the final section, these general
considerations are discussed in relation to the Tange case.
KEY WORDS: democracy, ethics, impartiality, landscape convention, water framework
directive
A fundamental question in political theory is who should make decisions where, how
and for what reasons. Should all citizens have equal shares in all decisions of
common concern, regardless of what is at stake? Should education, expertise, skill,
virtue and competence matter? Is private property of primary importance, and
should decisions be based on private owners’ and consumers’ willingness to pay?
How do we separate public from private goods? A quick look at modern democratic
societies will show that the answers to these questions differ widely across both
societies and sectors.
The European Landscape Convention focuses on landscape quality and democracy
under the heading ‘landscape democracy’. Given the variety of understandings of
democracy in other areas, no one ought to be surprised to find that here too there is a
variety of organizational models. This diversity is extended by the fact that landscape
changes are not determined only by local or even national decisions. A wide array of
international or global drivers influence landscapes, sometimes in fairly obvious ways,
other times in more concealed modes.
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This paper consists of two parts. In the first part, the story of the artificial Tange
Lake is presented, focusing on influential global drivers and on questions concerning
models of landscape democracy. The second part focuses on these questions in a
general manner. Three main democratic values and three orders of impartiality are
identified with the aim of highlighting the dilemmas we are facing when promoting
democracy in relation to landscape development. Finally, the paper returns to the
Tange case in order to see how the dilemmas occur in a specific setting.
Landscapes in a Globalizing World: The Tange Lake Case
A Landscape Marked by Global Drivers
Denmark has had a large export of agricultural products at least since 1828, when
the Corn Laws in England were lessened, and particularly after 1846, when the laws
were finally repealed. Reliance on agricultural export has had a huge influence on the
Danish landscape. Two-thirds of the land has been reserved for agricultural
purposes, most of it ploughed. Marshlands, meadows and lakes have been drained.
Ninety percent of all watercourses have been regulated.
The Danish landscape is a landscape geared for global export. Hopes for export
were also the main driver, when a group of farmers at the end of the nineteenth
century asked the Danish Heath Society to present a project proposal on irrigation
of the farmland along the shores of the Gudenaa, the only watercourse in Denmark
deserving the name ‘river’. The Heath Society was originally established with the
purpose of planting forests in heath areas of western Jutland, but soon became
involved in all kinds of projects making unproductive areas (heaths, moors, and
meadows as well as lakes and inlets) suitable for agriculture or forestry (Hansen,
2008).
The young engineer Kristian Thomsen proposed the creation of a canal parallel to
the river (Thomsen, 1905; Jacobsen, 1981). The gradient of the river was fairly large
here, and the canal would end up several meters above the level of the river making it
possible to irrigate the surrounding land–and to establish a hydropower plant.
However, Thomsen estimated that the irrigation project would never pay. It fell due
to the introduction of another global driver: railways and coal-fired steamships
making grain from overseas countries so cheap that Danish farmers had difficulties
competing (wherefore they soon changed to animal production).
A few years later, Thomsen made a second proposal, where he gave up irrigation
and concentrated on hydroelectricity. Instead of a canal he now suggested a dammed
lake. A commission was established (Faber & Thomsen, 1910), and Thomsen
managed to assemble a consortium of investors, who applied to the Danish
parliament for a concession in 1914. Thomsen’s new project was only possible
because cheap coal and railways had ruined a business which had been of primary
importance only a few decades before: river transport with barges to forest areas in
central Jutland. The cheap coal lessened the pressure on forests (only a few percent
were left in Denmark), and the railroad outmatched the barges. Transport no longer
had top priority in the use of the river.
Cheap coal from abroad also made the hydropower project economically fragile
until another event of global significance occurred. The First World War with trade
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Figures 1–3. Photographs of the stretch of the river that was later flooded. This stretch was a
popular mating ground for salmon and trout. Cattle and sheep grazed in the surrounding
meadows.
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blockade by submarines made the price on coal increase tenfold, and a fast growing
demand for electricity made Thomsen’s project seem extremely attractive,
particularly to the authorities in the nearby city of Aarhus, who became the main
investor (Nielsen, 1993). In 1918, the concession was given by the Danish parliament
(Rigsdagen, 1918). When the Tange plant began producing electricity in January
1921, it covered one fourth of the total electricity demand in Jutland.
Figures 4 and 5. Thomsen’s first project with an irrigation canal (dark blue) along the river
(light blue). The canal leads to a hydropower plant (Thomsen, 1905). In the second project, the
canal is replaced by a lake, flooding the whole basin (Faber & Thomsen, 1910).
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The project also changed the local landscape completely. Instead of a small river
with a fairly strong current surrounded by cropped meadows, a big lake with calm
water now dominated the landscape. Twenty-two farms, a couple of inns and various
other houses had been removed. Two hundred local landowners had been affected.
The new plant became a major focal point in the area. The ecology of the area was
changed, too. Most significantly, the local population of salmon disappeared, not
only because the stream was blocked during the construction period, but also
because anglers caught salmons which had problems getting upstream (Poulsen,
1935). The sea trout managed the situation better, but still continue to suffer from
the fact that the best spawning stretches were flooded.
Views and Actors
The hydropower concession was given for a period of 80 years (Rigsdagen, 1918).
It ran out in January 2001, when parliament had to decide whether to renew it.
A public debate started years before that and soon became heated (Arler, 2001). The
first movers were anglers, who saw the plant as an obstacle to the continuation of
viable stocks of salmon and sea trout. The question was whether this was argument
enough to drain the lake and remove the plant.
A strong local opposition against emptying the lake emerged, and a ‘Society for
the Preservation of Tange Lake’ was established in 1995. Today, 4500 individual
members and some 90 organizations support it. The backing comes from a broad
variety of people from house owners with a view to the lake, bathers, yachters,
rowers and surfers, to birdwatchers, friends of hydropower, landscape aficionados
and defenders of otters recently found in the lake. ‘What is most important?’, the
Society asks on its homepage (http://www.tangesoe.dk/). ‘‘To meet the demands of a
bunch of anglers hunting for salmon? Or to give space and opportunities for tens of
thousands of people, who are engaged in a variety of other activities, including
angling for other species than salmon.’’
The lake is a major landscape feature in an area without other characteristics of
comparable significance. Its continuous existence for 80 years has put its mark on
local habits and identities as well as on the ecology. Few people remember the
landscape before the lake. Infrastructure and settlements have been adjusted to it.
People row, sail and bathe; they fish, hunt and watch birds; they walk along the
shores and enjoy the view of the lake. Would a relief of the salmons’ troubles and the
realization of the anglers’ dreams outmatch this?
The anglers are aware of the difficulty of turning the satisfaction of their private
desire for catching fish into a strong public case. So they play the ‘naturalness’ card.
They assert that the main reason for restoring viable salmon and trout stocks is not
the satisfaction of their own private wants. These stocks form a natural part of the
river’s ecosystem, they claim, and the lake is an artificial construct obstructing the
natural course of events. ‘Natural’ is good, artificial bad. Artefacts cannot be
‘natural’, humans are not part of ‘nature’.
By playing the ‘naturalness’ card, the anglers strengthen their position in two
important ways. First, they dissociate their demands from their own private
(although undoubtedly ‘natural’) passion for catching fish, and elevate their course
from one of private preferences to one of public concerns. Second, they associate
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themselves with some forceful global drivers, the international conventions and EU
directives written with a similar appeal to ‘naturalness’.
The Convention on Biological Diversity from the Rio Summit in 1992 (UN, 1992)
recommends that not only species, but also subspecies or local strains, ought to be
preserved in situ, ‘‘in their natural surroundings’’ (Article 9). This is the convention
that anglers and other opponents to the lake and the plant referred to in the
beginning. The current salmon are not descendents of the ‘original’ population,
however. The anglers exterminated the salmon completely early in the 1920s, after
which fry had to be imported from other rivers. Consequently, the biodiversity
convention did not give much support.
Latterly, the EU Water Framework Directive (EU, 2000) has received the main
attention. According to this directive, ‘naturalness’ is the key value in the evaluation
of the state of water areas. The highest status is given to conditions showing no
human influence at all (Annex V, Table 1.2). This is the ‘reference condition’ in
relation to which artificial changes are perceived as deviations. Deviations are only
allowed in cases where environmental effects or economic burdens of restoring
an area to its ‘natural’ state are disproportionately high, or where environmental
and socioeconomic needs justifying an artificial state ‘‘cannot be achieved by other
means, which are a significantly better environmental option not entailing
disproportionate costs’’ (Article 4.5).
In 2007, a report requested by theDanish Society forNature Preservation concluded
that it was necessary to empty Tange Lake in order to meet the demands of the
directive. The positive effects would by far outmatch the negative ones, the report
concluded. The non-fossil electricity production could be replaced by electricity from
wind turbines, and the loss of sailing and other recreational activities could easily
be made up for (COWI, 2007b). The national board of the Society for Nature
Preservation therefore decided to support the drainage of Tange Lake. It was not a
real lake, anyway, but only an artificially dammed up river in need of restoration.
The local committees of the Society did not back up this conclusion. Not only are
significant cultural values at stake. The lake’s 80 years of existence has changed the
Figures 6 and 7. To the left, the artificial canal leading to the plant. To the right, an aerial
photo of the plant with the lake in the background.
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local ecology to such an extent that new interesting features have evolved. Even more
importantly, to local people, the value of the lake cannot be reduced to exchangeable
recreational options and carbon-neutral electricity. It is a significant part of their
landscape, not just a cluster of ‘recreational opportunities’. Recreation is not the
central issue at all. The river and the meadows, which are expected to replace the
lake, do not have the same kind of charisma. The landscape will change radically if
the lake is removed, but not, the local committee concluded, into something better.
In cultural landscapes, nothing is pristine anyway, and unaffectedness by human
beings is not an unquestionable value (DN, 2007).
Other stakeholders have interests in the area. In 2007, for instance, the Danish
Heritage Agency intervened by preserving the main dam with its locks, the canal and
the power plant itself due to their remarkable historical and architectonic value. The
Tange plant is the biggest hydropower plant in Denmark, and several of the leading
technicians and entrepreneurs of the period were involved in the project. Some of the
buildings now contain an electricity museum, which deservedly has become a
popular excursion spot with more than 80 000 visitors each year.
Figures 8 and 9. The hydropower plant and the narrow passage for migrating fish (Photos:
FA)
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Other actors work in the opposite direction. The Gudenaa runs through the areas
of several municipalities striving to enhance water quality in the river and to restore
sustainable stocks of salmon and sea trout. Upstream, a number of barriers have
been removed and a considerable amount of resources have been used on sewage
treatment. Revitalized stocks of salmon and trout would be a final mark of success,
and the narrow passage at Tange is looked upon with much suspicion.
One final actor ought to be mentioned: Niels Due Jensen, the central figure in the
family that owns the dominating company in the local area, Grundfos, a main global
producer of circulation pumps. Due Jensen is a passionate hunter and angler, and
claimed early in the process to be willing to pay a considerable part of the expenses,
if the river were restored. This intervention actually triggered the establishment of
the Society for the Preservation of Tange Lake. The initiators saw Due Jensen’s offer
as a sign of the exclusiveness of the interests of the lake’s opponents and warned
against letting purchasing power determine the outcome.
A Democratic Decision
The concession was given by the Danish parliament, and the decision as to whether
the plant shall survive or not has to be made here. The parliament has been hesitant,
however, and postponed the decision by extending the concession two years (Auken,
2000; Folketinget, 2000), then five years (Schmidt, 2002; Folketinget, 2002), and
finally six years (Lund Poulsen, 2007; Folketinget, 2007). The government parties’
argument for the latest postponement was to wait for the final water plan for the
river, which, in accordance with the time schedule of the EU’s Water Framework
Directive, should have been finished before the end of 2009, and for the action plans
to be published one year later (Lund Poulsen, 2007).
This is not a convincing argument. The crucial point is whether changes from
‘natural conditions’ are acceptable, either because the effects of restoration are
disproportionately high, or because the needs which justify artificial changes
cannot be met otherwise. The clarification of this point does not depend on local
water plans. Basically, it is a political question of what counts as reasonable
alternatives and as disproportionately high costs (see also EU, 2009). The answer
may be informed by economic assessments, if these take ability to pay into
account. First and foremost, however, the importance of the artificial landscape
features’ to the local identity needs to be evaluated. This may be the reason why
the Water Framework Directive recommends early public involvement (Article 14),
although the intention rather appears to be to avoid public opposition to centrally
devised plans.
The water plans were delayed one year, but in the recently published draft, the
deadline for setting up targets for the Tange Lake area is further postponed for
‘technical reasons’: there is no clear definition of the directive’s concept of ‘river
continuity’ (see EU, 2000, Annex V) and no clarity about how to interpret the
directive’s regulations concerning fish passages in established hydropower lakes (By-
og Landskabstyrelsen, 2010). So the long-awaited draft did not provide the help that
the politicians were hoping to get.
The majority parties in the parliament tried to hide behind technical issues, when
they requested a delay in order to get the local water plans finished and economic
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evaluations carried out. Several economic evaluations have been made already
(COWI, 2007a; Nickelsen, 1998; Skov- og Naturstyrelsen, 2002), and the crucial
questions about ‘reasonable alternative’ and ‘disproportional costs’ remain political.
Even if one decides to treat these questions as economic issues, this decision is in
itself of a political nature. The true motive for the postponement was basically the
same as in 2002 (Miljø- og Planlægningsudvalget, 2002): the politicians wanted a
time-out, knowing that no matter what decision they ended up with, it would be
unpopular with certain groups of voters.
Democracy and Its Values
It has been stressed in the debate concerning the destiny of Tange Lake that
decisions ought to be made democratically. This is entirely in line with the European
Landscape Convention, according to which landscape development is ‘‘the concern
of all and lends itself to democratic treatment, particularly at the local and regional
level’’ (Council of Europe, 2000, ER par. 23). It is far from obvious, however, what
this implies. Various models for decision-making may be relevant, because various
Figures 10 and 11. The rear view of the plant. Part of the electricity museum is placed in the
tallest building. (Photos: FA)
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Figures 12 and 13. Different solutions at Tange. In the 2002 report (Skov- og Naturstyrelsen,
2002), it is assumed that the lake shall continue to exist. The question is only whether to
establish a short or a long passage for fish. According to the 2007 report (COWI, 2007a) only
Model 10, which includes draining the lake, can meet the demands of the Water Framework
Directive.
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values and concerns are at stake (Arler, 2008). Let us take a quick look at these
values and concerns.
Self-determination
Personal autonomy, that is, self-ruling or self-determination, has been a basic tenet
in Western conceptions of democracy since antiquity. Personal autonomy or self-
determination is a complex concept that can be interpreted in a number of ways.
Basic to all, though, is the assumption that human beings are vulnerable creatures.
Without some kind of protection, an individual’s life zone may be in danger of being
invaded by others, making it impossible for the individual to pursue self-chosen
ideals of the good life.
Although autonomy has many aspects, quite often the concept is related directly
to liberal, liberalist and libertarian traditions in political philosophy, focusing mainly
on liberty or personal freedom understood negatively as absence of coercion (from
fellow citizens and the state) and public neutrality towards conceptions of the good
(Kymlicka, 2002; Raz, 1986). In other interpretations, however, such as those of neo-
Aristotelians, focus is rather put on the positive quality of being capable of doing the
right thing and promoting well-considered conceptions of the good. In this view,
autonomy is a comprehensive concept that includes much more than simply the
ability to do whatever one happens to wish.
Defences of self-determination can similarly be separated into at least two groups.
The first group makes a sharp distinction between the right and the good. People
have different conceptions of the good, and no one is capable of deciding which
conception is best. From this point of view, we must keep public regulations neutral
to the various conceptions, respect their creators, equip them with private rights, and
let them cultivate their ideals within their own private sphere. Each individual can be
expected to be a better judge than any other person of what is beneficial to his or her
own well-being. Often personal liberty is assigned status accordingly as a
transcendental value (Kant, 1785/1965), as a trump (Dworkin, 1977), as a side
constraint (Nozick, 1974), or as a primary good of overriding priority (Rawls, 1971).
Liberty should only be restricted for the sake of liberty, never for the sake of any
particular good.
The second group argues instead that the protection of a free space is
fundamental, because individuals have to learn to lead independent lives in order
to develop their capabilities to the full (Nussbaum & Sen, 1994; O’Neill, 1997). This
is a more classical position in line with conceptions originating in ancient Greece,
with Aristotle as a prominent figure. Liberty is not a transcendental value that
always trumps other values, and there is no reason to demand public neutrality to
conceptions of the good. Self-determination remains a value of highest significance,
but only because it must be considered an indispensable part of the good life.
On each of these two routes, one can find reasons enough to back up a claim to
protect self-determination within individual life zones. The question is only how
prominently this claim ought to be seated, and the implications it may have. Here,
we find a significant difference between the two lines of argument. From a classical
(or neo-Aristotelian) point of view, self-determination is considered in connection
with other values contributing to the good life, including a number of public goods.
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As important as it is, individual self-determination cannot be considered always to
override other kinds of goods.
On the other hand, liberalists and libertarians argue that the morally overriding
status of the value of self-determination implies that as many decisions as possible
should be made in the private sphere and coordinated through the market. If, as
Margaret Thatcher once phrased it, there is no such thing as society, but only an
aggregation of individual men and women, neither can there be a common good
apart from the aggregation of private goods. If markets cannot be established,
decisions should rely on methods aggregating private choices in ways resembling the
market.
An aggregated evaluation of the Tange case in accordance with the liberalist line
of argument has been suggested by some economists (Dubgaard, 1998; Harremoës
et al., 1998). This line of argument is also a main ingredient in the Water Framework
Directive’s demand for an economic assessment of the appropriateness of deviations
from ‘natural conditions’ (EU, 2000, Article 4.5). We have already seen this reflected
in the report to the Society of Nature Conservation (COWI, 2007a, 2007b), arguing
that the private benefits of saving the lake are not significant enough to overrule the
directive’s naturalness request. From the classical or neo-Aristotelian point of view,
on the other hand, the aggregated evaluation would only be relevant in cases where
no common goods appear to be of overriding importance. This kind of assessment
can only depend on arguments, never on individuals’ willingness to pay.
Co-determination and Participation
Co-determination and participation belong to another cluster of values with a long
tradition in democratic theory and practice. Adherents of self-determination in terms
of private liberty tend to focus almost exclusively on people’s private affairs. Thus,
decisions concerning common issues should be treated as virtual market aggrega-
tions based on surveys revealing people’s willingness to pay. Advocates of co-
determination, on the other hand, see public affairs as a separate field. They
particularly resent the idea of turning public affairs into a market-like playground,
where economic power determines the result. In the language of Rousseau, the
‘common will’ must be distinguished from the aggregated ‘will of all’ (Rousseau,
1762/1968). The citoyen must be kept separate from the bourgeois.
The line between private and public affairs is not easy to draw, however, and co-
determination is often interpreted in ways that make it equivalent to self-
determination. This is the case, for instance, when it is argued that everybody
ought to have influence on an equal basis, independent of economic strength and no
matter what they happen to desire. In this case, voting or preference surveys replace
willingness-to-pay surveys, but people may still rely on private wishes rather than on
public concerns. Another example is the utilitarian belief that we should seek the
solution that results in the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. In
both cases, the principle of equal consideration is basic: everybody should count for
one, and nobody should count for more than one (Bentham, 1789/1996; Mill, 1861/
1957; Singer, 1993). But the outcome is likely to be aggregations of people’s private
preferences rather than expressions of their well-considered convictions as citizens
concerning the common good.
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The American philosopher Mark Sagoff once asked his students whether they
supported the establishment of skiing facilities in the nearby protected area Mineral
King Valley (Sagoff, 1988). The students happened to turn down the proposal, even
though a vast majority was more interested in visiting a ski resort than an apparently
mosquito infected protected area. Sagoff concluded that they were capable of setting
their private interests aside and make choices as genuine citizens. But what if the
students had been biologists? Could we still be certain that they made their decision
as citizens? They would probably be easier to convince about protecting the area.
Even if they defended their position with reasons unrelated to their own private
desires, these desires would undoubtedly make them more sympathetic towards
preserving the park. After all, skiing resorts can be defended for social reasons, too;
that is, furthering public health, facilitating athletic activities, etc.
Co-determination of citoyens is sometimes co-determination of bourgeoises in
disguise. In the Tange case, some spokesmen of the Society for the Preservation of
Tange Lake have argued along these lines. Decisions should not focus on the
exclusive interests of anglers, they argue, nor be based on willingness to pay, giving
wealthy people inequitably great influence. Instead, decisions should reflect the
interests of ‘‘the tens of thousands of people, who are engaged in a variety of other
activities’’. This is basically a utilitarian argument ignoring the quality of reasons.
Only numbers count, not willingness to pay or publicly assessable arguments. If
everybody ought to have equal influence, no matter if wishes are coherent and well-
considered or not, all we have to do is to count preferences. It is far from obvious,
though, whose preferences should count. Stakeholders beyond the local area (and
beyond the current generations) are difficult to integrate systematically in the
decision process, if only preferences count and arguments are ignored.
Impartiality and Respect for Arguments
However, a third important value is also involved in the concept of democracy:
impartiality and respect for arguments. This is a value that is too often overlooked.
Whereas self-determination and co-determination both encourage the introduction
of partial desires and unconsidered preferences in the decision process, shifting focus
to respect for arguments and deliberation means separating wishes which are well-
considered from those that are not. In order to explain what this means, it can be
useful to draw on some points presented by the German philosopher Immanuel Kant
in his Anthropology (Kant, 1769/1980, par. 2). His main argument is that we should
try to overcome our instinctive egoism in logic, morality and aesthetics.
A logical egoist does not understand the necessity of letting other people test
judgements. He sees no need for inputs from other people. There is no point in
confronting a public audience of reasonable and well-informed colleagues or fellow
citizens. Disputes are games of power, where everybody tries to further certain
interests through slyness, force and fraud. In contrast to the egoist, logical ‘pluralists’
see the review of peers as encouraging. They are willing to learn from critique yet
remain firm on well-founded standpoints, even if no one else backs them up.
To a moral egoist, all aims are ultimately related to his own satisfaction. He has no
conception of duty and no sense for claims on mutual respect. Everything is seen
through the glasses of self-centred utility. The world is a playground for cynical
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calculators. The only rules that count are hypothetical imperatives, maxims of
prudence that even the sleaziest devil would follow out of self-interest. Moral
‘pluralists’, on the other hand, are led by categorical imperatives. They think of
fellow human beings as independent persons, whose requests for autonomous
flourishing lives are as legitimate as their own. According to the pluralists, any desire
or motive people may have for acting needs to be tried out in a universality test (see
also Kant, 1785/1965). The motives ought to be reasonable and the consequences of
their accomplishment acceptable to all.
Aesthetic egoists make do with their own judgements and ignore other people’s
reviews and evaluations. Aesthetic egoists believe that aesthetic impressions and
judgements are subjective to the extent that there is no point in arguing about them.
When people try to convince each other, this is only a matter of tricking and
deceiving. Aesthetic ‘pluralists’, on the other hand, wish to learn. They are never
satisfied with settled judgements, but appreciate evaluations that may help them
improve their own perceptions, sharpen judgements and qualify their conceptions of
beauty. Learning pluralists are always looking for qualified conversational partners.
When landscape qualities are at stake, pluralists wish to test ideas before panels of
landscape connoisseurs with diverse experiences. The diversity of views is a welcome
challenge, because this is where learning and deliberation are most likely to occur
(Brady, 2003). This is where one realizes which views to give up and which
conceptions will stand the test of close inspection and scrutiny. To aesthetic
pluralists, defending judgements against other people’s objections is equivalent to
justifying these judgements to themselves. This is an opportunity they would never
give up, not even if such a sacrifice would provide them with more influence over
their current hasty and unchallenged ideas and preferences.
Procedures and Multi-order Impartiality
Some defenders of self-determination identify autonomy as a formal liberty to think
and act as one prefers. There is no obligation to justify views and actions. Likewise,
it is sometimes argued that the value of co-determination must be based on equal
respect, not only for individuals, but also for their conceptions of the good, no
matter what these conceptions contain. In a democracy, each individual ought to
have equal influence, no matter which goods are pursued, and no matter how well
they are considered.
The insistence on impartiality as respect for arguments, without regard to their
source, opposes both self-determination and co-determination, if these are conceived
in such a simplistic way. From the point of view of deliberative democracy,
autonomy cannot be reduced to the formal liberty of doing whatever one wishes. To
be truly autonomous, one must be able to justify views and actions with impartial
arguments that everybody is expected to accept as appropriate and sufficient
(Scanlon, 2000). The core of democracy is deliberation; a free exchange of arguments
combined with the citizens’ enthusiasm for learning in order to find the best solutions
to problems occurring in the continuous pursuit of the good life.
Still, there is also some kind of impartiality involved in self-determination and
co-determination. Even if one insists that autonomy involves justifying, one has to
admit that sometimes even the best arguments do not settle conflicts unambiguously.
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In these cases, procedures which provide due respect for the values of self-
determination and co-determination offer second order impartiality. For instance,
one party may promote the establishment of a national park that is going to be
modified in order to make it appear like a pristine landscape. Another party may
insist on preserving some unique features of the cultural landscape originating
from certain cultural practices. In such cases, the making of reasonable decisions
becomes dependent on impartial procedures, rather than on impartial arguments
alone.
Procedures offer a kind of second order impartiality if an agreement is difficult to
reach. The choice of procedures is not smooth and easy, though, but is in itself a field
of conflicts. Different conceptions of democracy related to the three values pull in
different directions, as shown in Figure 14. The more one is convinced of the
necessity of relying on arguments, the more one is also likely to hold on to
procedures supporting rational deliberation, knowledge sharing and the furthering
of aesthetic awareness. Emotivist sceptics, on the other hand, who believe that
judgements rely on accidental private feelings, will pull in the opposite direction.
The traditional institutions of representative democracy constitute the backbone of
second order impartiality. In many cases, however, elected representatives want to
apply other kinds of methods and procedures or involve expert and connoisseur
opinions. Sometimes such procedures are already established by law, as is the case, for
instance, of public hearings following the publication of proposals for local plans.
Public involvement is also mentioned in the EU’s Water Framework Directive,
alongside obligatory expert opinion on water quality and economic evaluations of
exemptions.
In the Tange case, arguments concerning the selection of methods and procedures
have turned out to be as important as arguments related to the issue itself. When
choices of methods and procedures are controversial, it becomes important to
Figure 14. The three basic values of democracy point in the direction of different procedures
that may supplement the traditional procedures of representative democracy.
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determine who is responsible for the selection. Thus, the quest for impartiality is
relegated to a third level: the determination of the appropriate unit for decision-
making. Is there an impartial way of determining at which level the choice of
methods and procedures ought to be made?
Multi-level Democracy
The Concentric Circle Theory and the Principle of Subsidiarity
In order to deal with this question, let me bring in a theory congenial to Kant’s
critique of logical, moral and aesthetic egoism. The American philosopher Peter
Wenz calls it the Concentric Circle Theory (Wenz, 1988). The main point is that
although our attention is primarily focused on people closest to us, where obligations
are most comprehensive, obligations emerging from larger circles are, in a certain
sense, stronger than those emerging from the smaller and more exclusive ones. The
rules and obligations of the larger circles provide framework conditions for the
smaller ones.
We may, for instance, have emotionally strong comprehensive commitments
towards members of our family and yet be strongly opposed to nepotism. Similarly,
we may have strong feelings towards our local area and yet insist that national
authorities should not treat it differently from other areas, unless impartial reasons
can be stated which everybody else ought to accept as fair and equitable.
Commitments in larger circles frame the lives in smaller ones, and we are offended
if emotionally based small circle commitments seep into the larger circles.
At the same time, however, boundaries have to be set on the comprehensiveness of
demands from larger circles. If people are deprived of all opportunities for local or
even personal self-determination and become regulated down to the smallest detail
by a distant state or a supranational organization, they react, and rightly so. Even
when regulations are backed up by good reasons, there is always a significant
spectrum for converting general reasons into specific decisions and rules. Choices
within this spectrum should be made as locally as possible, even where local
communities are conflict-ridden.
This is why European Community representatives stated the Principle of
Subsidiarity explicitly in the preamble to the founding Maastricht Treaty on
European Union from 1992. This was not a new and unique invention, though. An
earlier formulation can already be found in Article 5 of the Treaty constituting the
European Coal and Steel Community from 1951, and much further back, the Tenth
Amendment of the American Constitution can be seen as a precursor, declaring the
sovereignty of the states participating in the federation. Even older examples can be
found.
The basic intention of the subsidiarity principle is to ensure that decisions will be
made as closely as possible to the citizens affected. Large circle organizations should
only take action when common interests are handled more effectively and equitably
here than at lower levels. Central authorities have subsidiary functions. Similarly,
the actions taken should not present more specific demands than necessary to the
lower levels. A free scope for culturally different choices should be left for low level
actors.
502 F. Arler
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [
A
al
bo
rg
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
] 
at
 0
4:
22
 1
0 
A
ug
us
t 2
01
1 
Table 1. Decisions concerning landscape features and qualities can be made at various levels.
A number of levels are separated where different sets of interests and motives are most
prominent
Level of decision Interests at stake
Individual level
Private preferences
. aggregated through preference surveys,
or
. monetized directly or indirectly, e.g.
through contingent valuation surveys
Private interests
Angling, yachting, rowing, bathing, various
kinds of landscape and nature
experiences, including cultural
experiences, lake views, house prices,
tourist opportunities
Felt moral commitments (‘warm glow’
preferences)
Local and regional levels
Political decisions
. at the municipality level
. at a regional level (taking account
of the whole river basin)
Local and regional identity
The lake as significant landscape feature,
the plant as cultural monument,
populations of salmon and trout as
symbols of an undisturbed (or restored)
river
National level
Political decisions
National priorities
Cultural heritage, CO2-neutral energy
production, sustainable populations of
salmon and trout, compliance with EU
directives and international conventions
International level
. EU’s Habitat Directive and Water
Framework Directive
. Council of Europe’s European
Landscape Convention, Architectural
Heritage Convention, Convention on
the Value of Cultural Heritage for
Society
. UN’s Biological Diversity Convention,
Bern Convention on European Wildlife
and Natural Habitats
. UNESCO’s Convention on World
Cultural and Natural Heritage
International priorities
In-situ protection of threatened species or
populations, water quality, habitat
protection, landscape quality, cultural
heritage
Democracy in the Tange Case
Let us say then, first, that all local areas should be treated equally. Second, local
decisions should not defy considerations leading to fair and reasonable commitments
at higher levels. Third, higher level commitments should never be so wide-ranging
that local life becomes trapped in a jungle of detailed regulations. In the Tange case,
a number of reasonable interests and commitments can be found beyond the local
area (see Table 1). Whenever there is a river, there are always local people who live
upstream and downstream and who do not agree with decisions made midstream.
The local level is not the only one of relevance.
At the national level, where the concession was given originally, various interests
are represented. These are strengthened by the fact that the Gudenaa is the largest
river and the Tange plant the largest hydroelectric facility in the country. Beyond the
national level, the most well-founded interest, in terms of organizational back-up, is
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that of water quality as defined in the Water Framework Directive. This directive
gives formal authority to the quest for water quality understood in terms of
‘untouchedness’. It also specifies procedures in cases of conflicting interests. If
interests are powerful enough, they overrule the directive’s substantial demands.
Exemptions from the ‘naturalness’ regime are allowed if advantages related to
artificiality are significant enough.
However, the directive appears to skip at least two levels of decision-making: the
local and the national level. It jumps directly from the EU level to market
aggregations of individual decisions. We saw previously how the report commis-
sioned by the Nature Conservation Society (COWI, 2007b) argued that it was
necessary to empty the lake in order to meet EU demands, because there are no
significant economic advantages in maintaining the lake. In this way, it is left to an
uncoordinated group of casual individuals, acting as self-interested bourgeoises, to
determine the destiny of the lake. The local and the national levels are set aside.
On the other hand, it is stated clearly in the directive’s preamble, in accordance
with the principle of subsidiarity, that decisions should be made ‘‘as close as possible
to the locations where water is affected or used’’, and that success in the
implementation of the directive ‘‘relies on close cooperation and coherent action
at Community, Member State and local level as well as on information, consultation
and involvement of the public’’ (EU, 2000, par. 13, 14 and 18). There seems to be a
discrepancy here, unless one identifies local decisions as those of strong economic
actors.
A non-legally binding Guidance Document on Exemptions notes that the rules
concerning allowance of exemptions are unclear (EU, 2009, 4). The guidance
document is only partly helpful in this respect, but it softens the rigid demands in the
Directive and emphasizes that it is not always necessary to monetize, sometimes not
even to quantify costs and benefits, in order to make assessments. If costs and
benefits are monetized, it is also relevant to include considerations about
stakeholders’ ability to pay. Decisions should be based on an ‘‘appropriate mix of
qualitative, quantitative and, in some cases, monetized information’’. The key
message is that assessments of disproportional costs are basically political. They may
be informed by economic analysis, but can never be reduced to book-keeping (EU,
2009, 13f, 28).
A similar message was stated in the first Guidance Document on Economics and the
Environment from 2003. Economic analysis does not make decisions on its own. It
can formulate recommendations at best. In the end, assessments whether costs are
disproportional and exemptions are justifiable rely on political judgements (EU,
2003, 14, 25). This does not tell us much about the appropriate political level, but in
the Tange case, the primary political institution is inevitably the parliament, where
the concession was given originally. It makes a lot of sense to coordinate the
decision-making with local representatives, but relevant well-founded interests
outside the Tange area cannot be ignored either. Even though some formulations in
the Water Framework Directive may tempt hesitating politicians to hide behind
economic calculations, there is no escape from genuine political decision-making at
the national level.
Selecting the appropriate level is never a straightforward matter. If strong reasons
back up decision-making at a transnational level, both national and local decisions
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must comply with these reasons. It does seem inappropriate, however, when higher
authorities decide to skip one or more of the lower decision levels altogether and
leave it to private consumers to determine whether a common feature, towards which
local people exhibit emotionally strong involvement, is worthwhile preserving.
Concluding Remarks
The Tange Lake case clearly illustrates the challenges we face when promoting
landscape democracy in accordance with the European Landscape Convention. Not
only are a number of divergent and sometimes even incompatible landscape values
typically at stake. A diversity of democratic values is also involved as well as a
variety of procedures and decision levels to choose from, or rather, to assign proper
roles to.
In this article, I have focused on three fundamental values involved in democratic
decision-making: self-determination, co-determination and respect for arguments.
The third of these, respect for arguments, is often ignored, but is as basic as the other
two. Respect for arguments narrows the decisional spectrum considerably, but even
the best arguments are seldom decisive enough to leave us with only one solution still
standing. The construction of decision-making procedures thus becomes important.
If impartiality and respect for arguments are recognized as basic democratic values,
this ought to be reflected in the selection of procedures that further deliberation, free
exchange of arguments and mutual learning.
In the end, though, the legitimacy of the selected solutions relies just as much on
the common acceptance of the chosen procedures as on the substantial arguments
presented in the particular case. Procedures always occur at specific levels, but it is
seldom altogether obvious which level should be most decisive. Still, the so-called
Concentric Circle Theory and the Principle of Subsidiarity give us good guidelines in
this respect. The basic point is that higher level decisions must be considered as
overriding, but that they should never be so comprehensive and detailed that they
exclude differences due to cultural dissimilarities on lower scales.
Apart from illustrating these dilemmas, the story of the Tange Lake also clearly
shows us that the range of landscape democracy in a globalizing world is limited by
boundaries. All kinds of external factors from technological innovations and distant
political decisions to global economic trends and climate changes, none of which
have any immediate relation to a specific landscape, may influence its actual shape to
a large extent. More refined democratic procedures for decision-making can
undoubtedly avert some of the roughest and most devastating effects, but it can
never totally prevent external impacts that no one ever called for. World history
continues to leave significant unintentional marks on local landscapes, as it proceeds.
This is not altogether a bad thing. It also creates novel material for new intriguing
landscape narratives.
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